Alvin Plantinga. A Defense of Religious Exclusivism. RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIVISM VERSUS RELIGIOUS PLURALISM. 1. Exclusivism holds that a particular. This is a collection of philosophical papers by Alvin Plantinga. () ” Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism”, The Rationality of. In “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism” Alvin Plantinga defends religious exclusivism from a variety of objections. In this paper I discuss one of those.
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Exclusivism holds that a particular religion is the only way to get in a proper relationship with God the only way to salvation. Consider one such addition we might make to RC.
Cambridge University Press, So they cannot be charged with being arbitrary. Exclusivism is a vice: The belief that the tenets or some of the tenets of one religion are in fact true and, moreover, any propositions, including other religious beliefs that are incompatible with those tenets are false.
Pluralism: Defense of Religious Exclusivism – The Veritas Forum – The Veritas Forum
But now suppose that [the original medical researcher] learns about all the other results…. Consider, then, the following anti-exclusivist principle that Feldman thinks sufficiently captures common intuitive exclsivism to cases of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. And, if not, then such cases provide ample reason to think that the consequences of accepting a principle like B are untoward. And, even if she could, how likely is it that this sort of thing happens plantjnga fact or, perhaps better: So far as I can tell, Feldman does not offer any argument as to why we should think B properly rules out mere seemings from justifying in cases of peer disagreement.
The Allvin in a pluralist society Previous: Exclusivists or their beliefs are irrational, arbitrary, unjustified, unwarranted. Humans require salvation, God provides unique way to it and that way is through Jesus Christ his incarnated son.
If it does, by virtue of what argument does it do so? If you had been born in Nazi Germany you would have been Anti-Semitic. Find it on Scholar.
Pluralism: Defense of Religious Exclusivism
That is, A is a principle regarding mere disagreement as to whether p between two or more parties in which each party is aware of the other, dissenting, party, as opposed to disagreement as to whether p between two or more parties who believe each other to be equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, whether p.
But if the abstemious pluralist accepts 3then they must hold that they should not accept 3 — since they are in condition C with respect to 3.
You do this by supposing that Plantinga endorses EP, and then showing that Feldman has introduced a principle, B, that contradicts EP without so much as an argument as to why EP might be false other than introducing B. Even so, suppose Plantinga, or some other exclusivist, does endorse EP. Also exclusivists deny that others are saved, whereas pluralists do not deny this though they might deny this of atheists. And RC helps us plantinag see why: Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify this point.
Admits there is real piety and spirituality in those religions. Setting a reading intention helps you organise your reading. Click here to sign up. For example, should in the moral sense of that word the bigot believe differently than she does even if she has no reason to hold the competing belief? X, I think there are additional things we can say about or add into the bigotry case that kf it more clearly a refuting counterexample to B than not.
But I reply that this objection misses the context of the dialectic. How would it be possible to do better with respect to any belief? B does not apply to exflusivism.
“Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism"
Maybe Feldman would be comfortable with this sort of skeptical conclusion. All B adds to A, as far as I can see, is the notion that if a person disagrees without reason, then that person disagrees unreasonably.
So, let us assume that we have particular intuitive reactions—i. Then they are subject to no censure for flouting their epistemic duty. Whatever moral failures exclusivism has, non-exclusivism has as well. But he thinks we should all agree because A is a principle regarding mere acknowledged disagreement as opposed to acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. If you had been born in India, you would be a Hindu not a Christian.
Recall, again, principle B: Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion: Arrogant, elitist, egotistical, unjust, oppressive, and imperialistic.
Possible criticisms of Plantinga claims: Religious exclusivism is not necessarily a moral or intellectual failure and, because?